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Abstract
The main component of this thesis is a paper which examines the
relationship between oil price shocks and stock market returns across 15
countries. Prior to this paper, I discuss the vast literature surrounding oil
prices and their effect on the macroeconomy.
The post-World War II period contains many examples of oil price
shocks preceding US recessions causing many authors to postulate theories
regarding the mechanisms which could explain this phenomena. As these
theories garnered very little support from empirical studies, the unearthing
of the true underlying mechanism driving oil price shocks became a
major focus. This led Kilian (2009) to decompose oil prices into various
components and show that, using a structural vector autoregression model,
demand shocks are the main driver in explaining variations in the price of
oil.
Specifically focusing on the precautionary demand shocks identified
by Kilian (2009), the paper presented in this thesis uses a similar
quantile-on-quantile (QQ) regression model to the one introduced by Sim
and Zhou (2015) in order to examine the behaviour between stock returns
and oil price shocks. The study examines 15 countries whose classification
as oil importers or oil exports depends on their net position in crude
oil trade. The results indicate that the main finding by Sim and Zhou
(2015) that large negative oil price shocks can bolster stock returns when
markets are performing well is only partially supported by the three
largest oil importers in the sample China, Japan and India during the
period 1988:12007:12. When extending to more recent data (period 1988:1
ii
2016:12) it is found that China and India experience higher returns when
markets perform well and there is a large positive oil price shock. This
effect is mirrored for oil exporting countries Canada, Russia, and Norway
and moderately oil dependent countries such as Malaysia, Philippines, and
Thailand, which see higher returns in the presence of large positive oil price
shocks and well performing markets.
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Ever since the poor performance of the US economy in the 1970s, much
research has focused on the influence of oil prices on the macroeconomy,
as illustrated by the seminal work by Hamilton (1983) titled Oil and the
Macroeconomy since World War II.
In his paper, Hamilton (1983) looked at US recessions since World War
II and highlighted that most of them are preceded by a sharp increase in
oil prices. Hamilton thus hypothesized that either this relationship is a
matter of statistical coincidence; the relationship is endogenous and there
is some third exogenous variable which influences both oil prices and the US
economy; or that oil price increases are exogenous and partly responsible
for some of the recessions in the US since World War II.
Using Sims (1980) macro-econometric model, Hamilton performed
Granger-causality tests to investigate whether any of the six variables
present in the model: real GNP, money, unemployment, wages, the price
level, and import prices, could statistically predict oil shocks. All variables
were unambiguously ruled out based on time series regressions using a
data set spanning from 1948 to 1972. Moving on to the hypothesis
of endogeneity, Hamilton found little support that the variables are
endogenous and that some third variable can explain the relationship. It
is worth noting that none of the six variables in Sims model, nor inventory
changes, capacity utilization rates, interest rates, or stock prices could be
used to statistically predict the oil price increases which preceded the US
recessions. While Hamilton did find some evidence that aggregate strike
activity and coal prices were statistically informative about oil prices, they
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were not significant enough to also account for the decline in US output
during those times. This thus strengthened the case for exogeneity. When
one considers the timing of the oil price increases over this time period,
it strongly suggests that they were due to events which are undoubtedly
exogenous to the US macro economy. This lead Hamilton (1985) to
analyse further these historical events in a paper titled “Historical Causes
of Post-war Oil Shocks and Recessions”.
From 1947 to 1972, all but one of the oil shocks were followed by a US
recession and all three of the major oil shocks in the 1970s were followed by
a US recession. While Hamilton (1983) found sufficient evidence to reject
statistical coincidence and the idea that some third endogenous variable
was involved, his results remained insufficient to validate the exogeneity
hypothesis without identifying the historical events which caused these oil
shocks.
The first large oil price increase was in 1947 following decontrol of
government prices for oil (Hamilton (1985)). Despite the increase in
oil prices, there was still a surging demand for oil due to reduced coal
production and European reconstruction. As investment into higher oil
production has a large lag associated with it, supply was unable to keep up
with the rising demand and hence, shortages ensued. What followed was
the first post World War II recession from 1949:Q1 to 1949:Q41.
In 1951, the Iranian oil industry was nationalised, leading to a sharp fall
in production. While Iranian production plummeted, half the production
shortfall was matched by increased production in the United States
11949:Q1 to 1949:Q4 refers to the time period of the first quarter of 1949 to the forth
quarter of 1949
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(Hamilton (1985)). This contrasts with 1952 that saw shortages in oil and
steel as workers in the oil and coal industries went on strike. At the time,
prices were controlled by the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC). Once
these controls were lifted however, a large increase in oil prices ensued,
leading to another recession from 1953:Q3 to 1954:Q2.
The invasion of Egypt in late 1956 saw the reduction in oil flowing
through the Suez Canal. This had a significant impact on European
countries which were dependent on oil from the Middle East. While various
European countries suffered from oil shortages, the TRC was hesitant to
relax production constraints. In the end, production constraints were
relaxed, and a large increase in oil prices together with a US recession
followed from 1957:Q4 to 1958:Q2.
The early 1960s marked the first recession post World War II which was
not preceded by an increase in oil prices. This was caused by strikes by fuel
oil deliverers, and the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union (Hamilton
(1985)). These strikes produced the smallest post-war recession since the
early 1960s. These events, along with the granger causality tests performed
by Hamilton (1983), established a strong argument in favour of exogenous
oil price increase leading to negative macroeconomic effects in the US.
However, over the next couple of decades, this causal relationship was
brought into question as more data became available. Indeed, significant
structural changes happened over the 1970s, with the increased influence
of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the
removal of domestic production control from the TRC, the floating of the
US exchange rates, and the poor economic performance of the US during
the 1970s.
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In 1996, Hooker (1996) found that oil prices no longer Granger caused
many US macroeconomic variables when data beyond 1973 were included
into the analysis. Hooker (1996) used a similar VAR model to Sims
(1980) and Hamilton (1983) with some changes to the number of variables
included and their lag length. While Hooker investigated some potential
explanations for this, he ultimately concluded that none of the hypotheses:
sample stability issues, endogenous oil prices, and misspecification of the
oil price and macroeconomy relationship with linear VAR models, was
supported by the data.
While Hooker (1996) put into doubt the relationship identified by
Hamilton (1983), a possible relationship between oil and the macroeconomy
remained. Indeed, from the 1970s to the early 2000s, the US saw many
instances of exogenous political events, oil price increases, and recessions.
In 1973, an Arab-Israeli war and an OPEC oil embargo lead to an oil
price increase and resulted in a US recession from 1974:Q1 to 1975:Q1. In
October 1978, an Iranian revolution saw the Iranian production of oil fall
over 90%, which was equivalent to 9.1% of the world production (Hamilton
1985). This was followed by a US recession from 1980:Q1 to 1980:Q3.
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980 further reduced oil
production along with the decontrol of crude oil in early 1981 which led to
an increase in oil prices. Once again a US recession followed in 1981:Q3
to 1982:Q4. The invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 created disruptions to
the oil production and an increase in oil prices. This was followed only a
couple of months later by a US recession from 1990:Q3 to 1991:Q1. This
is contrasted with the usual lag of three quarters from oil price increase to
recession. The same phenomena was noticed when the 2001:Q2 to 2001:Q4
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US recession was preceded two years earlier by the 1999 OPEC meeting
which was seen as the reason for the oil price increases in 1999.
Figure 1: Source: Barsky and Kilian (2004) (Department of Energy, Federal
Reserve Economic Database (FRED), and National Bureau of Economic
Research)
2 Theoretical links between oil prices and
the macroeconomy and stock market
returns
Although the econometric relationship between oil prices and the macro
economy is a useful discussion to have, it ignores the actual mechanisms
in which oil prices affect the macro economy. This last point is
addressed by Barsky and Kilian (2004) who reviewed the suggestions
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made in the literature regarding a possible link between oil prices and the
macroeconomy and investigated whether some empirical evidence exists to
support these ideas.
The first theoretical link under scrutiny is one made by Hamilton (1988)
and concerns the effect of reduced consumption on large goods (e.g. cars)
due to an increase in oil prices. This change in demand often results in
transfers of labour or capital between sectors which, depending on market
frictions, can be costly. A consequence of such a relationship should
result in a symmetrical effect. Under this theory, the oil price increases
in 1979-1980 and subsequently in 1986, which were of a similar magnitude,
should have a resulted in a similar negative macroeconomic effect. However,
while there was a rise in US unemployment following the 1979 to 1980 oil
price increase, there was no rise in US unemployment following the 1986
increase.
In an earlier paper, Bernanke (1983) suggested that the uncertainty
surrounding oil prices was likely to result in the postponement of investment
decisions. Therefore, even if the oil price is not a direct contributor to
large changes in GDP, the uncertainty that surrounds it reduces current
investment by a large amount. Looking at real consumption of durable
goods and real investment data from 1973 to 2003, Barsky and Kilian
(2004) however found little empirical evidence to support the claims by
Bernanke (1983) and Hamilton (1988).
The next significant theoretical consideration for oil prices causing
negative macroeconomic conditions was put forward by Bohi (1989) and
Bernanke et al. (1997) and involves the influence of a monetary policy
response. Simply put, oil price increases are inflationary and hence
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monetary authorities respond with contractionary monetary policy, which
is recessionary. Furthermore, if wages are sticky then employment fall due
to labour being less productive because of lower energy inputs. However
empirical evidence suggests that as US wages actually did fall in response
to higher oil prices in the case of the 1974 US recession, the contractionary
monetary policy actually preceded the oil price increase.
Another theoretical consideration is that as oil prices rise, energy
intensive or energy inefficient capital becomes too costly and obsolete, thus
leading to reduced output without any apparent change in capital. One
would thus expect this effect to be offset by increases in investment to
replace now obsolete capital. However, just like previous theoretical links,
no empirical evidence supports the obsolete capital hypothesis, as discussed
in Hulten et al. (1987) and Bohi (1991).
Finally, focusing on specifically oil prices and not just energy prices
in general, Olson (1988) examined the link between higher oil prices and
the productivity slowdown during the 1970s and 1980s. He found that
the direct effect of higher import prices of oil are not sufficient enough to
explain the slowdown.
In view of all the studies presented above, Barsky and Kilian (2004)
concluded that no convincing empirical support linking oil prices and
negative macroeconomic conditions exists either because the magnitude
of the effect is too small or because the theory results in phenomenon that
are not evidenced by the data.
Next turning to stock markets, the hypothesis that oil prices affect
economic growth through their relationship with stock market returns is
widely accepted. Higher oil prices, for example, contribute to headline
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inflation that reduce real consumption and economic agents may be willing
to accept lower rate of returns on financial assets in order to smooth
consumption to future periods. Higher oil prices also lead to higher cost
of production, which may constrain the economy and limit investment
opportunities. The basic theory of asset pricing says that factors that have
a plausible systematic influence consumption or investment opportunities,
such as crude oil prices, should affect the pricing of large stock aggregates.
However, the empirical evidence on the effects that oil price shocks exert on
stock markets has been mitigated or sometimes inconclusive. For example,
authors such as Kling (1985), Jones and Kaul (1996), and Abhyankar et al.
(2013) find a negative relationship between oil prices and stock market
returns, whereas authors such as Chen et al. (1986), Apergis and Miller
(2009), and Lin et al. (2010) find no evidence for this relationship.
The quantile-on-quantile regression approach used in this thesis
examines the distributional impacts of the relationship between oil prices
and stock market returns. Evidence within the portfolio management
literature has shown that there exist distributional specific effects between
assets classes. For example, Longin and Solnik (2001) find that
international equity market are more correlated when they are bearish,
Patton (2006) finds evidence that the Deutsche mark-dollar and Japanese
yen-dollar exchange rate are more correlated when they are deprecating
versus appreciating, and Guidolin and Timmermann (2004) find evidence
of stronger tail dependence in stocks and bonds during bearish times. Given
this evidence and the previously stated theory that oil prices should affect
the price of large stock aggregates it suggests that this relationship maybe
be found by looking at the distributions of oil prices and stock market
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returns. My thesis provides some evidence towards this theory, and gives
the opportunity for further research to generalise this to other commodities
and their effect on stock market returns.
3 How do political events affect oil prices?
Simple correlation could lead one to believe that exogenous political events
in the middle east are the main driver of oil price shocks. However,
given that political events do not always precede oil price shocks, and
that sometimes oil price shocks are apparent in the absence of turmoil
in the middle east, the question remains regarding the identification of the
mechanisms by which these political events affect oil prices.
One intuitive economic connection between exogenous political events
in the middle east and oil prices is their effect on the supply of oil, as
many of the events preceding oil price increases and US recessions had
drastic impacts on the oil supply. In 1951, the nationalization of Iranian
oil production saw production levels drop from 19 million barrels a day to
none. While temporarily matched by an increase in US production, the
fall in production was not contained as a single strike by US workers saw a
third of the country’s oil refineries shutdown leading to a loss of 65 million
barrels of oil production. In 1956, as a result of the Suez crisis, the middle
east oil production fell again by levels equal to 10.1% of total world crude
oil production. The Iranian revolution in 1978 saw a reduction in crude oil
production equal to 8.9% of world oil production. In 1980, The combined
oil production drop as a result of the Iran-Iraq war was equal to 7.2% of the
world production. Finally, the invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Persian
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Gulf war saw a drop-in world crude oil production equal to 8.8% of 1990
world production levels (Hamilton (2003)).
Assuming that the change in oil price was purely driven by these changes
in supply, one would expect the effects to be consistent, but they are
not. For example, while the drop in relative oil product as a result of the
Iran-Iraq war was similar to that of the Invasion of Kuwait, (7.2% and 8.8%
respectively) the change in the nominal price of oil was vastly different. The
invasion of Kuwait marked a 40% change in the nominal price of oil, whereas
the Iran-Iraq war saw an increase of around 10% (Barsky and Kilian 2004).
Along with the differing quantitative effects from falls in oil production,
some changes in oil prices manifested in qualitatively different ways. For
example, the oil price increase which followed the Iranian revolution was
characterised by small persistent price increases over a two-year period
(Barsky and Kilian (2004)). This contrasts with the 1990 Persian Gulf
war oil price increase which was an immediate large spike in oil prices. If
oil price shocks from exogenous political events were driven by changes to
production of oil then no quantitively and qualitatively differing results
should be observed from similar events.
Barsky and Kilian (2004) thus postulated a different theory, whereby
changes in oil prices are driven by changes to the precautionary demand
for oil and that this change in precautionary demand represents consumers
fears around the certainty of oil supply in the future. As a result, political
conflicts in the middle east are seen to raise concerns around the availability
of oil supply in the future and lead consumers to stock up oil today thereby
increasing the price of oil. This is even more likely when oil production is at
capacity and oil supply is very inelastic. With this interpretation, Barsky
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and Kilian (2004) changed the focus from supply to demand for oil.
The attraction of the theory advanced by Barsky and Kilian (2004) is
that it can potentially explain the link between exogenous political events
in the middle east and the price of oil while also allowing for quantitively
different results. It also justifies why oil prices can increase in the absence
of production cuts due to conflicts in the middle east, as illustrated by the
oil price increases prior to the Iraq war in 2003. Under their theory, the
increase in the price of oil is due to an increase in demand from consumers
who were uncertain of a future supply of oil as they were anticipating the
conflict in Iraq. This theory is further supported by the fact that once the
conflict had begun, no sharp increase in the price of oil was observed as it
was already factored into the market.
While this theory is powerful at explaining the relationship between
political conflicts and the price of oil, it does rely on consumers’ uncertainty
about oil supply, which is an unobserved variable. In order to address this
issue, Killian built on his earlier work further by disentangling oil price
into three components; oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and
oil-specific demand shocks. By doing so, he could attribute the last of
these components to the changes in precautionary demand for oil driven by
uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls (Kilian (2009)). This model
represents the foundation of my thesis, which I present in the following
section.
11
4 Model of the decomposition of oil prices
A commonly used approach in the literature on oil prices and their effect
on the macroeconomy is to assume that oil prices are exogenous. As
previously discussed in the theories presented earlier, exogenous political
events in the middle east would thus for example be assumed to cause
unanticipated shocks to oil production and this would flow exogenously
through to the US economy. This mechanism through the supply of oil
lacks in credibility and led to the exploration of whether oil price shocks
are exogenous with respect to the macroeconomy. The first issue with
the exogeneity assumption however is the potential for reverse causality
between macroeconomy aggregates and oil prices. Also, there is another
issue related to the fact that oil prices are driven by distinct demand and
supply shocks which can have drastically different effects on oil prices and
the macroeconomy. An example of the layered relationship between oil
prices and the macroeconomy is a global demand shock. Indeed, a boost in
global demand can have a direct impact on an economy but also indirectly
through a change in the price of oil, thus invalidating the exogeneity
assumption.
To address these issues Kilian (2009) proposed a structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) model of the global crude oil market, where he
decomposes oil prices into three components; oil supply shocks, aggregate
demand shocks, and oil-specific demand shocks (precautionary demand
shocks). Supply shocks relate to the current availability of crude
oil, aggregate demand shocks relate to changes in the global demand
for all industrial commodities from changes in the business cycle, and
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precautionary demand shocks arise from changes in demand due to
uncertainty in the future supply of oil. The major difficulty with this
framework lies in measuring changes to global demand for crude oil due to
fluctuations in the global business cycle. The contribution by Kilian (2009)
using the decomposition of oil prices resides in the creation of a measure
of global real economic activity which is based on an index of cargo ocean
shipping freight rates.
The SVAR set up by Killian is as follows,
A0zt = α +
p∑
i=1
Aizt−i + εt (1)
where zt represents a vector consisting of; ∆prodt which is the percentage
change in monthly global oil production, reat denotes the measure of global
real economic activity, and rpot is the real price of oil in month t. In
equation (1), εt represents a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated
structural innovations. Kilian postulated that the vector of reduced-form
errors et, can be decomposed by A
−1
0 which has a recursive structure, in



















The restrictions captured by matrix A−10 model the relationships
between the different variables used in this model. The first assumption is
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that there is no change in oil production as a result of changes in the real
price of oil or in global real activity. This is motivated by the fact that it
would be costly for oil production facilities to make short run changes in
production as a response to the global real activity or the real price of oil
within one month. The second assumption is that global real activity does
not response to changes in the real price of oil within one month, which
is consistent with the sluggish behaviour of global real activity. This then
leaves the final variable to account for changes in oil price which cannot be
explained by oil supply shocks or shocks to global real activity. Kilian states
that this final variable is demand shocks specific to the oil market which
represent changes in precautionary demand due to uncertainty in the future
supply of oil. Kilian (2009) also considered that this final variable could
represent changes in preferences, or weather shocks, but later dismissed
them as he found overwhelming evidence that changes in uncertainty and
expectations are the driver behind these changes.
Using the model presented above, Kilian estimated the effect these
various shocks have on the price of oil. Specifically, he showed that
precautionary demand shocks cause immediate, large, and persistent
changes in the price of oil, that global aggregate demand shocks cause
delayed but sustained changes in the price of oil, and that production
shocks cause small temporary changes to the price of oil within the first
year. Kilian also showed that when considering historical changes in the




In the following part of this thesis, I present a paper which revisits the
debate on the relationship between oil price shocks and stock market returns
by replicating the quantile-on-quantile (QQ) regression model for the US
stock market in Sim and Zhou (2015, Journal of Banking and Finance),
and extending it to 15 countries. The classification of these countries
as oil importers or oil exporters depends on their net position in crude
oil trade. Our results indicate that the main finding by Sim and Zhou
(2015) that large negative oil price shocks can bolster stock returns when
markets are performing well is only partially supported by the three largest
oil importers in our sample– China, Japan and India– during the period
1988:1–2007:12. However, when extending the study to more recent data
(period 1988:1–2016:12), we find that China and India experience higher
returns when markets perform well and there is a large positive oil price
shock. Also, large positive oil price shocks often lead to higher stock
market returns when markets perform well for both oil exporting countries–
Canada, Russia, Norway– and moderately oil dependent countries– such as
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. In most cases large negative oil price
shocks depress further already poorly performing markets, as in Sim and
Zhou (2015). These findings highlight that the relationship between the
distributions of oil price shocks and stock market returns is not stable
over time in most countries studied. Furthermore, the asymmetric effect
between positive and negative oil price shocks observed in the US market by
Sim and Zhou (2015) is less evident in most countries for both the baseline
and extended periods.
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In this paper, we revisit the debate on the relationship between oil price shocks and stock market
returns by replicating the quantile-on-quantile (QQ) regression model for the US stock market in
Sim and Zhou (2015, Journal of Banking and Finance), and extending it to 15 countries. The
classification of these countries as oil importers or oil exporters depends on their net position
in crude oil trade. Our results indicate that the main finding by Sim and Zhou (2015) that large
negative oil price shocks can bolster stock returns when markets are performing well is only partially
supported by the three largest oil importers in our sample– China, Japan and India– during the
period 1988:1–2007:12. However, when extending the study to more recent data (period 1988:1–
2016:12), we find that China and India experience higher returns when markets perform well and
there is a large positive oil price shock. Also, large positive oil price shocks often lead to higher
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in Sim and Zhou (2015). These findings highlight that the relationship between the distributions
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extended periods.
Key words: Oil prices; stock returns; Quantile regression.
JEL classification: C01, C14, C31, G15.
∗Corresponding author. E-mail: firmin.dokotchatoka@adelaide.edu.au. Address: The University of
Adelaide, School of Economics, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Hamilton (1983) several studies have investigated
the link between oil price shocks and either the macroeconomy,2 or financial
markets.3 Yet no clear consensus has emerged as to whether such a link even
existed. Our paper revisits this debate by replicating and extending the
model proposed for the US by Sim and Zhou (2015, Journal of Banking and
Finance) to 15 countries, whose classification as oil importing or exporting
depends on their net position in crude oil trade.4 We show that although the
findings by Sim and Zhou (2015) apply to the large oil importing countries
of China, India, and Japan, they do not apply to large oil exporting
countries such as Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela.
Using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR), Kilian (2009) and
Kilian and Park (2009) identify three structural shocks to oil prices in the
US; demand, supply and oil-specific demand. They find that precautionary
demand shocks are the largest contributor to the relationship between
oil price shocks and stock market returns. Sim and Zhou (2015) offer
further insights into this relationship by using a quantile-on-quantile (QQ)
approach. Stock markets, they argue, may react differently to small, large,
positive, or negative oil price shocks (see Figure 14 in the appendix). Their
framework thus aims to differentiate the effects of oil prices on the US
stock market conditional on the sign and the size of oil price shocks and
2See e.g. Barsky and Kilian (2004), Hamilton (1996), Mork et al. (1994), Lee et al.
(1995), and more recently Ratti and Vespignani (2016).
3See e.g. Kling (1985), Jones and Kaul (1996), Chen et al. (1986), Sadorsky (1999),
and more recently Broadstock and Filis (2014), Kang et al. (2015), Maghyereh et al.
(2016), Balcilar et al. (2017), and Zhang (2017).
4Aloui et al. (2012) and Wang et al. (2013) adopted a similar classification.
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the performance of the US stock market.
In this paper, we adapt the framework by Sim and Zhou (2015) to
account for the impact of the US stock market on other countries, and
apply the model to countries that are considered to be either oil importer,
oil exporter or moderately oil dependent. Our results corroborate those
of Sim and Zhou (2015) when considering large oil importing countries, in
that large negative oil price shocks5 may lead to higher returns when the
market is well performing and lower returns when markets perform poorly
during the period 1988:1–2007:126. However, when extending the study to
more recent data (period 1988:1–2016:12), we find that China and India
experience higher returns when markets perform well and there is a large
positive oil price shock. Also, we find that large positive oil price shocks
often lead to higher stock market returns when markets perform well for
both oil exporting countries– Canada, Russia, Norway– and moderately oil
dependent countries– such as Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Finally,
in most cases, large negative oil price shocks depress further already poorly
performing markets, as in Sim and Zhou (2015).
While much of the early literature on oil price shocks and stock market
returns focus on the US, there has been an increased interest in developed
countries in Europe and Asia, and developing countries across the world. In
particular, Wang et al. (2013), and Cunado and de Gracia (2014) suggest
that when considering other countries besides the US, the significance of the
precautionary demand shocks are lower. Using a Vector Error Correction
Model (VECM), Cunado and de Gracia (2014) analyze the impact oil price
5With the exception of Japan where the negative oil price shock is small.
61988:1–2007:12 refers to the time period of January 1988 to December 2007
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shocks have on stock market returns in 12 oil importing European countries.
They find that the relationship between oil price shocks and stock market
returns is negative, and that supply shocks have a greater impact than
demand shocks.
Park and Ratti (2008) consider 13 European countries along with the US
to conduct a multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) analysis on oil price
shocks and stock market returns. They conclude that there is a statistically
significant negative impact of oil price shocks on stock market returns in
the same month or within one month.7 They also look at the asymmetric
effects of stock returns on oil price shocks. They find some evidence for the
US and Norway, but little evidence for any other oil importing European
country.
Using a SVAR approach, Apergis and Miller (2009) analyse three
types of oil price shocks on stock market returns from eight countries–
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States – and find that international stock market returns
do not respond in a large way to oil market shocks. Using a similar
methodology, Abhyankar et al. (2013) show that the Japanese stock market
reacts negatively to oil price increases related to oil-market specific demand
shocks, and Lin et al. (2010) show that global oil demand and oil specific
demand shocks have no significant impacts on China’s stock market returns.
Wang et al. (2013) consider the relationship between oil price shocks
and stock market returns for a range of oil importing and oil exporting
7Except for Norway which shows a positive relationship. They attribute this to
Norway being a net oil exporter. Bjørnland (2009) confirms this result for Norway
showing that following a 10% increase in oil prices, stock returns increase immediately
by 2-3% with the effect gradually dying off after 15 months.
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countries, using the SVAR methodology by Kilian (2009). They find that
the magnitude, direction, and duration response of an oil price shock impact
the stock market returns differently in oil importing countries compared
with oil exporting countries. They further show that the nature of the
price shock– whether it is driven by supply or demand– affect oil importing
countries differently from oil exporting countries.
In their study, Fang and You (2014) analyse whether the stock market
returns of the three large Newly Industrialised Economies’ (NIE), namely
China, India and Russia, can be explained by fundamental oil demand and
supply shocks, and find mixed results.
More recently, Bouoiyour and Selmi (2016) used a QQ approach to
study G7 stock market responses to oil price shocks accounting for China’s
slowdown. They find responses to be asymmetric and show that markets
in Germany, Italy, Canada and the United Kingdom are typically more
responsive than those in France, Japan and the United States.
Basher and Sadorsky (2006) use an international multi-factor model
to investigate the relationship between oil price shocks and stock market
returns for 21 emerging stock markets. While they find strong evidence
of such a relationship, their results are inconsistent and vary with the
frequencies of data used. For daily and monthly data, they find that an
increase in oil prices has a positive effect on stock market returns, while
the same effect occurs for a decrease in oil prices using weekly and monthly
data.
Aloui et al. (2012) consider emerging countries, which they separate
into three groups– net oil exporting countries, net oil importing countries,
and moderately oil dependent countries– depending on their net position
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in crude oil trade. Using the framework of Basher and Sadorsky (2006),
they find that the sensitivity of stock market returns in relation to oil price
shocks is asymmetric and particularly significant during periods of rising
oil prices. They also find that the relationship between oil price shocks and
stock returns during bearish periods is positive in moderately oil dependent
countries and negative for oil exporting countries. No relationship is found
however for oil importing countries during either bullish or bearish periods.
Güntner (2014) examines the relationship between structural oil price
shocks and stock market returns in six OECD countries, comprising of four
oil importing countries - the United States, Japan, Germany, and France
- and two oil exporting countries - Canada and Norway. Using the model
developed by Kilian (2009), they find similar results to Kilian and Park
(2009). In particular, they find that oil supply shocks have no significant
impact of oil price shocks on stock returns, while aggregate demand oil
shocks have a positive effect on stock returns, although more persistent for
exporters and in particular Norway. They also show that precautionary
demand oil shocks have a negative impact on stock returns for importing
countries, a positive effect for Norway, but no effect for Canada.
The rest of the paper is organised as follow. Section 2 introduces the
model by Sim and Zhou (2015), and the changes we made to extend its
application to countries outside the US. Section 3 presents the data used










be a sample of n observations where r
jt
is the stock
returns of country j at time t and oilt denotes the oil price shock at
time t due to variations in precautionary demand.8 Consider the following
quantile-on-quantile framework [similar to Sim and Zhou (2015)]:
r
jt








where βθj (·) is a possible unknown function that links oil price shocks to
the θ-quantile of the stock returns of country j, r
US,t−1 is the US stock
market returns at t − 1, and υθ
jt
is an error term that has zero θ-quantile.
Although model (3) is similar to that of Sim and Zhou (2015), focusing on
countries other than the US requires controlling for the global influence of
the US market in the equation. Indeed, it is highly likely that changes in
the US market affect the stock returns in markets worldwide. Therefore
the inclusion of r
US,t−1 in the RHS of (3) is required in order to identify α1j
as well as the link function βθj (·).
Under the standard regularity conditions on the link function βθj (·) [see
Sim and Zhou (2015)], the first order Taylor expansion of βθ(·) around oilτ ,
where τ represents the quantile of oil price shock gives:
βθj (oilt) ≈ β0j(θ, τ) + β1j(θ, τ)(oilt − oilτ ), (4)
8Following Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009), oilt represents the oil price
shocks arising from changes in oil precautionary demand filtered from the structural
vector autoregressive(SVAR) model. In this study, we approximate oilt following the
same steps as in Sim and Zhou (2015). The details of this estimation are omitted to
shorten the exposition of the paper.
23
where β0j(θ, τ) ≡ βθj (oilτ ) and β1j(θ, τ) ≡ ∂βθ(oilτ )/∂oil′t is the score of
βθ(·) evaluated at oilt = oilτ . Now substituting (4) into (3) gives:
r
jt





where α1(θ) := α
θ
1 and α2(θ) := α
θ
2. The term (∗) in the RHS of (5)
represents the θ conditional quantile of country j’s stock returns, and
captures the dependence between the θ-quantile of country j’s returns and
the τ -quantile of the oil price shocks. Clearly both the intercept term,
β0j(θ, τ), and the slope coefficient, β1j(θ, τ), are functions of θ and τ. As
(θ, τ) ∈ [0, 1]2, the 3D plots of β0j(θ, τ) and β1j(θ, τ) in [0, 1]2 inform us on
the dependence structure between the distribution of the stock returns and
that of oil price shocks for a given country j.
To estimate the parameters of model (5), we employ quantile regression
technique. As the oil price shocks oilt are not observed, we approximate
them with the fitted shocks ôilt from the 3 variables SVAR model as in Sim
and Zhou (2015), and replace oilτ with the empirical quantile of ôilτ . We

















where ρθ(·) is the tilted absolute value function that gives the θ-conditional
quantile of rjt as a solution, and M(·) is the Gaussian kernel function that
weighs the observations around the neighborhood of the τ -quantile of oil
price shocks. To estimate these weights, we follow Sim and Zhou (2015)
and use a bandwidth of h = 0.05 and the empirical distribution function of
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1[ôilk < ôilt], (7)
where 1[C] = 1 if condition C holds, and 1[C] = 0 otherwise. Although
we are aware of issues involving kernel regressions, especially the choice of
the kernel function and the optimal bandwidth parameter h, we use the
Gaussian kernel function with a bandwidth of h = 0.05 in order to mimic
the methodology of Sim and Zhou (2015).
3 Data and estimation
We use monthly data from Datastream spanning from 1988:1 to 2016:12
for 15 countries.9 Replication of the main results in Sim and Zhou (2015)
are presented in Table 6 and Figure 14 of the appendix, using their US
data for the period 1988:1 to 2007:12. Their conclusion that the slope
estimates tend to meander around zero in large regions of the parameters
space is supported by our replication, but we identify a peak at the lower
θ-quantiles of the US stock returns [see Figure 14-(b) in the appendix]
rather than the upper θ-quantiles of the US stock returns.
Following Wang et al. (2013), we separate the 15 countries in our sample
into three categories depending on their net trade balance in crude oil as
9For China, Colombia, India, and Venezuela, we were only able to get data for the
period 1993:1 to 2016:12. Similarly, we could only collect data for Russia for the period
1995:1 to 2016:12.
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shown in Table 1 (where the net positions are for the year 200910).
Crude Oil Imports Crude Oil Exports Net Position
(1000 barrels/day) (1000 barrels/day) (1000 barrels/day)
Oil importers
China 4,082 104 -3,978
Japan 3,725 0 -3,725
India 3,185 0 -3,185
South Korea 2,348 6 -2,342
Germany 1,980 2 -1,978
Taiwan 946 0 -946
Oil exporters
Russia 36 4,891 4,855
Norway 20 1,800 1,780
Venezuela 132 1,594 1,462
Mexico 10 1,303 1,293
Canada 818 1,980 1,162
Moderately oil dependent
Malaysia 115 254 140
Philippines 136 26 -110
Thailand 803 45 -758
Colombia* – – –
Table 1: Categorization of countries in our sample
*Data was unavailable for Colombia
For each country, the stock returns are calculated as the continuously
10Aloui et al. (2012) established a similar classification using the average net position
between 1997 and 2006. In this study, we follow the one year classification by Wang et al.
(2013) as it includes all countries in our sample except Colombia, while the classification
used by Aloui et al. (2012) excludes many countries.
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compounded returns of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
market index (in US dollars) minus the inflation rate. The inflation rate
is calculated as the log difference in the consumer price index (CPI) over
time. For oil price shocks, we use monthly data from 1988:1 to 2016:12 on
crude oil production and prices (in US dollars) from the US Department of
Energy. We then compute the global real activity as formulated by Kilian
(2009)11 using an index of cargo ocean shipping freight rates. Finally, we
follow Sim and Zhou (2015) and filter the oil price shocks through their
3 variables SVAR model. To facilitate the comparison with the findings
in Sim and Zhou (2015) for the US, we conduct our analysis for: (i) the
period 1988:1 to 2007:12 [similar to Sim and Zhou (2015)], and (ii) the
extended period 1988:1 to 2016:12. The estimation of the model over the
extended period allows us to check the stability of the results over recent
years, and whether there are variations in the differences across countries
in our sample.12 For the clarity and readability of our results, we thus
present for each period (baseline and extended) the estimates β̂0j(θ, τ) of
the intercept, and that β̂1(θ, τ) of the slope coefficient.
3.1 Intercept estimates
In this section, we analyze the results for the estimates β̂0j(θ, τ) of the
intercept term in (5). An interesting feature of the quantile-regression
(5) is that the intercept coefficient still captures the stock market and
oil price shocks movements of country j through its dependence on their
11We thank Professor Kilian for providing us the formula of the global real activity
index that we use to extend the data to 2016:12.
12We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the extension of the analysis to more
recent data.
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respective quantiles, even though on average it measures the predicted level
of country j’s stock returns when the values of the regressors other than
a constant term are set to zero. This is not possible in a standard linear
regression setting because the intercept estimate is constant conditional on
the sample, and thus is not influenced by the distributions of the stock
returns (θ-quantiles) and oil price shocks (τ -quantiles). Therefore, the
quantile regression framework allows us to measure the joint impact that
the θ-quantiles of the stock returns and the τ -quantiles of oil price shocks
exert on the stock market of country j when oil price shocks τ -quantile
deviations (oilt − oilτ ) and US global influence (rUS,t−1) are set to zero in
(5). This can be achieved, for example, by examining the plots of β̂0j(θ, τ)
as a function of (θ, τ) in [0, 1]2. Our aim is to examine in which regions of
(θ, τ) ∈ [0, 1]2 the distributions of stock returns and oil price shocks are
dependent, and to what extent this dependence impacts on stock returns
(through their effect on the intercept estimates β̂0j(θ, τ)). To investigate
this further we believe that a combination of 3D graphical representations
[similar to Sim and Zhou (2015)] and summary tables will facilitate the
comparison across the categories of countries, and also allows for a more
thorough comparison with the results of Sim and Zhou (2015).
For the remainder of the section, results are presented for quantiles
ranging from 0.06 to 0.94 in increments of 0.02 for both the stock returns
and the oil price shocks. As a consequence, each country has 2025 estimated
values of β̂0j(θ, τ) corresponding to the different points (θ, τ) in the grid
[0.06 : 0.02 : 0.94]2. This grid is similar to that of Sim and Zhou
(2015) for the case of the US. We interpret the θ-quantiles of the stock
returns greater than to 0.75 as reflective of positive market conditions,
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while those less than 0.25 represent negative market conditions. The stock
markets with θ-quantiles lying in the interval [0.25, 0.75) are interpreted as
neutral. However, no country in our sample exhibits statistically significant
coefficients when θ ∈ [0.25, 0.75), and this classification is thus omitted in
the presentation of our results.
Moreover, we also separate the τ -quantiles of oil price shocks into
four categories: (i) large negative shocks (symbolized by q1) which
correspond to the values of τ less than 0.25; (ii) small negative shocks (q2)
corresponding to the values of τ ∈ (0.25, 0.5]; (iii) small positive shocks
(q3) corresponding to the values of τ ∈ (0.5, 0.75]; and finally (iv) large
positive shocks (q4) corresponding to the values of τ greater then 0.75.
In the 3D representations (e.g. in Figure 2), β̂0j(θ, τ) (the z-axis) is
plotted against the θ-quantiles of the stock returns (the x-axis) and the
τ -quantiles of the oil price shocks (the y-axis). In the tables however,
we report for each country, and for a given market condition (positive or
negative) and a given oil price shock type (q1,q2,q3 or q4), the maximum
(in absolute term) of the estimated coefficients β̂0j(θ, τ) for all (θ, τ) in
the specified region in grid [0.06 : 0.02 : 0.94]2. These maxima usually
correspond to the peaks of the 3D representations in that region– e.g., see
Figure 2. The codification ‘∗’ in the tables indicates that the absolute
value of the difference between the estimate and the sample average of the
estimated coefficients β̂0j(θ, τ) in the specified region is larger than 2.6 times
the standard deviation of the sample average. Although this rule is not a
proper statistical test, it can be interpreted as indicating the regions of the
parameters where the maximum (in absolute term) estimated coefficient is
significantly different from the sample average of the estimated coefficients
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β̂0j(θ, τ) in that region at the 1% nominal level. Finally, for the purpose
of clarity, we discuss our results separately for oil importing, oil exporting,
and moderately oil dependent countries, as classified in Table 1.
A. Oil importing countries
Figures 2 & 3 present the results for oil importing countries for both periods,
baseline and extended. Figure 2 shows the results for the three largest oil
importing countries in our sample– China, Japan, and India, while Figure 3
contains those of medium oil importing countries– South Korea, Germany,
and Taiwan. These graphical representations are complemented by Table 2
that summarizes the maximum estimated impact β̂0j(θ, τ) for each country,
and for a given market condition (Positive or Negative) and a given oil price
shock type (q1,q2,q3 or q4). The first part of the table shows the estimates
for the baseline period (1988:1–2007:12), while the second part of the Table
presents the estimates for the extended period (1988:1–2016:12).
Let us first focus on the baseline period which coincides with the period
considered in Sim and Zhou (2015). From Figure 2-(2a), (2c) & (2e) and the
first part of Table 2, we see that in general the three largest oil importing
countries experience increased returns when the market is performing well
(Positive: θ-quantiles of the stock returns greater than 0.75) and there is
a large negative (q1 for China, Japan) or small negative (q2 for India) oil
price shock. This result corroborates the findings by Sim and Zhou (2015)
for the US [see Table 6 and Figure 14-(a)]. However, China and Japan also
experience higher returns when the market is performing well and there
is a large positive (q4) oil price shock, which is at odds with the findings
of Sim and Zhou (2015) for the US. India differs from the other large oil
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importing countries (China and Japan) as it does not overreact when the
market is performing well and there is a large positive (q4) oil price shock.
Finally, when the market performs poorly (Negative: θ-quantiles of the
stock returns less than 0.25), all three countries experience lower returns
when there is a large negative oil price shock (q1), which corroborates
the findings by Sim and Zhou (2015). For the medium oil importing
countries– South Korea, Germany, and Taiwan– the impact of a positive
market (θ-quantiles of the stock returns greater than 0.75) is quite similar
across all oil price shock types (q1,q2,q3 or q4), with South Korea showing
the highest impact at q4 (large positive oil price shock); see Figure 3-(3a),
(3c) & (3e) and the first part of Table 2. Clearly, this contradicts the
main conclusion by Sim and Zhou (2015) for the US market. Nevertheless,
all medium oil importing countries (South Korea, Germany, and Taiwan)
experience lower returns when there is a large negative oil price shock (q1)
and the market is performing poorly (Negative: θ-quantiles of the stock
returns less than 0.25), a finding similar to that of China, India and Japan
(largest oil importing countries). The latter result is also translated by the
peaks at the bottom of each subfigure of Figure 2 & 3, and are also reported
in the first part of Table 2 (period 1988:1–2007:12).
We now analyse the results for the extended period which includes both
data during the Global Financial Crise (GFC) and post GFC. Looking at
the US graphs (see Figure 14), the extension to more recent data does
not change significantly the response of the intercept (β0(θ, τ)) to a large
positive (q4) oil price shock when the positive market is performing well
(θ-quantiles of the stock returns greater than 0.75); see Figure 14: (14a) vs.
(14b). However, the results have changed drastically for most oil importing
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countries in our sample. Indeed, while China [Figure 2-(2b)] and India
[Figure 2-(2f)] experience higher returns when the market is performing
well (θ-quantiles of the stock returns greater than 0.75) and there is a
large positive (q4) oil price shock, the other oil importing countries [Japan:
Figure 2-(2d), South Korea: Figure 2-(3b), Germany: Figure 2-(3d), and
Taiwan: Figure 2-(3f)] exhibit a relatively uniform impact across all oil price
shock types (q1 to q4) when the market is performing well. These results
are also shown in the second part of Table 2 (period 1988:1–2016:12), and
contradict the main findings by Sim and Zhou (2015). When the market
is performing poorly (θ-quantiles of the stock returns less than 0.25), all
countries experience lower returns across all oil price shock types (q1 to
q4). However, except for a large oil price shock (q1), the impact is quite
uniform from small negative to large positive oil price shock (q2 to q4)
for China, India, Japan, and Germany. South Korea experiences a deeper
decrease in returns when there is a large or small negative oil price shock
(q1, q2) but the impact is quite similar for small and large positive oil price
shock (q3, q4). Taiwan experiences a decrease in returns when there is a
large negative oil price shock (q1), but there is no clear trend for the other
types of oil price shocks (q2 to q4).
As extending the analysis to GFC and post GFC data seems to alter
the results significantly, we can conclude that the relationship between the
distributions of oil price shocks and stock market returns is not stable over
time. We acknowledge that identifying the possible causes to this instability
is important but we leave this analysis to future work. Moreover, due to
insufficient data, we are not able to apply the QQ analysis to the post GFC
period alone, which makes it difficult to quantify the relationship between
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the distribution of oil price shocks and that of the stock returns in the post
GFC period. Future work could elucidate this question. It is also worth
mentioning that the evidence shown in this study is purely descriptive and
is far from identifying causal patterns between the distribution of oil price
shocks and that of stock market returns. As such, extending the analysis
to recent data (including the GFC period) is still informative, although the
identification of oil price shocks from the SVAR system may be problematic
during the GFC.
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(a) China’s β0: period 1993–2007 (b) China’s β0: period 1993–2016
(c) Japan’s β0: period 1988–2007 (d) Japan’s β0: period 1988–2016
(e) India’s β0: period 1993–2007 (f) India’s β0: period 1993–2016
Figure 2: 3D representation of β0 as a function of market conditions (θ) and
oil price shocks (τ) for the largest oil importing countries.
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(a) South Korea’s β0: period 1988–2007 (b) South Korea’s β0: period 1988–2016
(c) Germany’s β0: period 1988–2007 (d) Germany’s β0: period 1988–2016
(e) Taiwan’s β0: period 1988–2007 (f) Taiwan’s β0: period 1988–2016
Figure 3: 3D representation of β0 as a function of market conditions (θ) and
oil price shocks (τ) for medium oil importing countries.
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Period 1988:–2007:12
Market conditions Oil price shock
Max impact of β0
China Japan India South Korea Germany Taiwan
Positive q1 0.266
∗ 0.169∗ 0.085 0.182 0.103 0.181
q2 0.155 0.168
∗ 0.180 0.176 0.164∗ 0.190
q3 0.150 0.073 0.176 0.196 0.107
∗ 0.169
q4 0.303
∗ 0.209∗ 0.158 0.224∗ 0.099 0.183
Negative q1 −0.421∗ −0.150∗ −0.216∗ −0.285∗ −0.172∗ −0.219∗
q2 -0.137 −0.147∗ -0.175 -0.200 -0.080 -0.197
q3 -0.239 -0.097 -0.144 -0.144 -0.080 −0.221∗
q4 -0.150 -0.064 -0.137 -0.156 -0.058 -0.167
Period 1988:–2016:12
Market conditions Oil price shock
Max impact of β0
China Japan India South Korea Germany Taiwan
Positive q1 0.207 0.139
∗ 0.209∗ 0.141 0.125∗ 0.159
q2 0.145 0.137
∗ 0.164 0.138 0.135∗ 0.135
q3 0.153 0.073 0.126 0.173 0.097 0.165
q4 0.333
∗ 0.119 0.283∗ 0.184∗ 0.117 0.168
Negative q1 -0.178 −0.141∗ −0.222∗ −0.287∗ −0.167∗ −0.254∗
q2 -0.168 -0.103 -0.163 −0.269∗ -0.115 -0.141
q3 -0.165 -0.126 -0.141 -0.119 -0.098 -0.178
q4 -0.169 -0.084 -0.182 -0.139 -0.105 -0.131
Table 2: Joint effects of market conditions and oil price shocks on the intercept estimate for oil importing countries.
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B. Oil exporting countries
Figures 4 & 5 and Table 3 present the intercept results for oil exporting
countries. As before, the analysis is conducted for the baseline period
1988:1–2007:12 (similar to Sim and Zhou (2015)) and the extended period
1988:1–2016:12.
As seen, the results are different from that of the oil importing countries
in Table 2 and Figures 2 & 3. First, looking at the baseline period
1988:1–2007:12, we see that a large positive oil price shock (q4) often leads
to the highest returns when the market is performing well (Russia, Canada,
and Noway); see Figure 4-(4a), (4c) & (4e) and the first part of Table
3. Mexico and Venezuela experience higher returns when the market is
performing well, but the impact is quite similar across all price shock types
(q1 to q4); see Figure 5-(5a) & (5c) and the first part of Table 3. For
Canada, a large negative oil price shock (q1) does not significantly increase
the stock returns when stock markets are performing well. All these findings
once again contrast with that of Sim and Zhou (2015). Moreover, Mexico,
Russia, Venezuela, and Canada all experience the lowest returns when the
market is performing poorly (θ-quantiles of the stock returns less than 0.25)
and there is a large negative oil price shock (q1), while under poor market
performance Norway is seeing the lowest returns when there is a small
negative oil price shock (q2). These findings are confirmed by the peaks at
the bottom of each subfigure of Figures 4 & 5, and are also reported in the
first part of Table 3 (period 1988:1–2007:12).
When considering the estimates of the model for the extend period
1988:1–2016:12, we see that the results have changed drastically for Russia
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[Figure 4: (4a) vs. (4b)], and in some ways for Canada [Figure 4: (4c)
vs. (4d)], Norway [Figure 4: (4e) vs. (4f)], and Mexico [Figure 5: (5a)
vs. (5b)]. This highlights once again that the relationship between the
distributions of oil price shocks and stock market returns is not stable over
time.
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(a) Russia’s β0: period 1995–2007 (b) Russia’s β0: period 1995–2016
(c) Canada’s β0: period 1988–2007 (d) Canada’s β0: period 1988–2016
(e) Norway’s β0: period 1988–2007 (f) Norway’s β0: period 1988–2016
Figure 4: 3D representation of β0 as a function of θ and τ for oil exporting
countries: Russia, Norway, and Canada
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(a) Mexico’s β0: period 1988–2007 (b) Mexico’s β0: period 1988–2016
(c) Venezuela’s β0: period 1993–2007
Figure 5: 3D representation of β0 as a function of θ and τ for oil exporting
countries: Mexico and Venezuela.
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Period 1988:1–2007:12
Market conditions Oil price shock
Max impact of β0
Russia Canada Norway Mexico Venezuela
Positive q1 0.269 0.090 0.127 0.139 0.316
∗
q2 0.346 0.091 0.116 0.168
∗ 0.315∗
q3 0.302 0.073 0.121 0.135 0.285
q4 0.460
∗ 0.113∗ 0.186∗ 0.136 0.222
Negative q1 −1.218∗ −0.128∗ −0.153∗ −0.303∗ −0.875∗
q2 −0.460∗ -0.066 −0.158∗ -0.158 −0.485∗
q3 -0.184 -0.055 -0.139 -0.142 −0.462∗
q4 -0.186 -0.092 -0.068 -0.170 -0.311
Period 1988:1–2016:12
Market conditions Oil price shock
Max impact of β0
Russia Canada Norway Mexico
Positive q1 0.258 0.083 0.123 0.134
q2 0.246 0.087 0.132 0.143
q3 0.244 0.084 0.118 0.136
q4 0.622
∗ 0.169 0.212∗ 0.187∗
Negative q1 -0.319 −0.102∗ -0.137 −0.320∗
q2 -0.295 -0.066 −0.159∗ -0.143
q3 -0.211 −0.122∗ −0.168∗ -0.121
q4 -0.260 −0.112∗ -0.100 −0.206∗
Table 3: Joint effects of market conditions and oil price shocks on the intercept estimate for oil exporting countries.
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C. Moderately oil dependent countries
The results for the four moderately oil dependent countries– Malaysia,
Philippines,Thailand, and Colombia– are presented in Figures 6 & 7 and
Table 4. Consider first the estimates from the period 1988:1–2007:12.
As seen from Figure 3: (3a) vs. Figure 6: (6a) & (6c), and Table 2
vs. Table 4, the reaction of the stock market to oil price shocks in
Malaysia and Philippines is quite close to that of South Korea under
positive market conditions. Colombia mimics Taiwan very well when the
market is performing well, while Thailand differs to the other moderately
oil dependent countries in the sense that it experiences higher returns when
the stock market is performing well, and there is a positive oil price shock
(both q3 and q4). Thailand and Colombia share the same results under
poor market conditions and large negative oil shocks, i.e. when their stock
markets perform poorly, a large negative oil shock often results in decreasing
their stock returns. However, under poor market conditions and large
negative oil shocks, Malaysia and Philippines experience the lowest stock
market returns when there is a large positive oil shock (q4), which is at
odds with the findings by Sim and Zhou (2015).
Extending the analysis to the period 1988:1–2016:12 does not drastically
change the results for moderately oil dependent countries except for
Malaysia and Philippines under poor market conditions; see Figures 6
& 7 and Table 4. Indeed, Malaysia and Philippines experience the
lowest returns when the market is performing poorly (θ-quantiles of the
stock returns less than 0.25) and there is a large negative (q1), while
the lowest returns for these countries were observed using the sample
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period 1988:1–2007:12 for a large positive oil shock (q4). The findings
for the remaining moderately oil importing countries are the same as those
for the period 1988:1–2007:1, meaning that the relationship between the
distributions of oil price shocks and stock market returns can be seen as
quite stable over time in those countries, a finding similar to that of the
US [Figure 14: (14a) vs. (14b)].
(a) Malaysia’s β0: period 1988–2007 (b) Malaysia’s β0: period 1988–2016
(c) Philippines’s β0: period 1988–2007 (d) Philippines’s β0: period 1988–2016
Figure 6: 3D representation of β0 as a function of θ and τ for moderately oil
dependent countries: Malaysia and Philippines
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(a) Thailand’s β0: period 1988–2007 (b) Thailand’s β0: period 1988–2016
(c) Colombia’s β0: period 1993–2007 (d) Colombia’s β0: period 1993–2016
Figure 7: 3D representation of β0 as a function of θ and τ for moderately oil
dependent countries: Thailand and Colombia
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Period 1988:1–2007:12
Market conditions Oil price shock
Max impact of β0
Malaysia Philippines Thailand Colombia
Positive q1 0.110 0.164 0.176 0.157
q2 0.118 0.150 0.129 0.185
q3 0.110 0.174 0.237
∗ 0.158
q4 0.164
∗ 0.230∗ 0.317∗ 0.145
Negative q1 -0.156 -0.161 −0.364∗ −0.298∗
q2 -0.111 -0.155 -0.178 -0.215
q3 -0.120 -0.119 -0.148 -0.146
q4 −0.202∗ -0.169 -0.169 -0.146
Period 1988:1–2016:12
Market conditions Oil price shock
Max impact of β0
Malaysia Philippines Thailand Colombia
Positive q1 0.102 0.185 0.110 0.160
q2 0.102 0.127 0.135 0.168
q3 0.106 0.143 0.255
∗ 0.141
q4 0.141
∗ 0.271∗ 0.247∗ 0.163
Negative q1 −0.252∗ −0.213∗ −0.261∗ −0.208∗
q2 -0.112 -0.133 -0.180 -0.121
q3 -0.124 -0.121 -0.115 -0.120
q4 -0.124 -0.135 -0.134 −0.196∗
Table 4: Joint effects of market conditions and oil price shocks on the intercept estimate for moderately oil dependent countries
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3.2 Slope estimates
Our analysis in Section 3.1 focuses on the intercept estimates but the
dependence between the distributions of stock returns and oil price shocks
can also impact on the slope coefficient estimates β̂1j(θ, τ). Therefore, it
is also important to quantify the impact that the θ-quantiles of the stock
returns and the τ -quantiles of oil price shocks exert on the stock market
of country j due to changes in β̂1j(θ, τ) when (θ, τ) varies in [0, 1]
2. As in
the previous section, we present the results separately for oil importers, oil
exporters, and moderately oil dependent countries.
A. Oil importing countries
Figures 8 & 9 present the results for the largest (China, Japan, and India)
and medium (South Korea, Germany, and Taiwan) oil importing countries
respectively for both the periods 1988:1–2007:12 and 1988:1–2016:12.
Considering first the the baseline period 1988:1–2007:12, it is obvious
from Figure 8: (8a), (8c) & (8e) and Figure 9: (9a), (9c) & (9e) that
there are several regions of the parameters (θ, τ) ∈ [0, 1]2 where the
estimated β̂1j(θ, τ) are statistically different from zero for all countries,
which contrasts with the findings of Sim and Zhou (2015, Fig. 4). While
well performing stock markets (Positive) tend to increase insignificantly
the stock returns in Germany when there is a large negative oil price shock
(q1), it is possible that China, Japan, and Taiwan experience a counter
effect depending on whether the negative effect of β̂1j(θ, τ) observed here
offsets the positive effect on β̂0j(θ, τ) in Table 2. For both India and South
Korea, well performing stock markets (Positive) do not seem to have a
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significant impact on β̂1j(θ, τ) when there is a large negative oil price shock
(q1), thus the net effect for these countries is reduced to the one observed
in the first part of Table 2.
Now, looking at the results for the extended period 1988:1–2016:12
[Figure 8: (8b), (8d) & (8f) and Figure 9: (9b), (9d) & (9f)], we see
that for all countries, the shapes have many plateaus and ridges but
the slope estimates tend to meander at zero. Therefore, well performing
stock markets do not seem to have a significant impact on β̂1j(θ, τ) when
there is a large negative oil price shock (q1). This highlights that for the
period 1988:1–2016:12 the net effect on the stock returns of all countries
due to a positive market news, combines with a large oil price shock, is
reduced to the one observed in the second part of Table 2. These findings
again illustrate that the relationship between the distributions of oil price
shocks and stock market returns is not stable over time. Furthermore,
except for India and South Korea, the 3D graphical representation of
other oil importers illustrates that the estimated β̂1j(θ, τ) do not meander
around zero in most of the parameter regions for the baseline period
1988:1–2007:12, unlike what was found by Sim and Zhou (2015, Fig. 4).
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(a) China’s β1: period 1993–2007 (b) China’s β1: period 1993–2016
(c) Japan’s β1: period 1988–2007 (d) Japan’s β1: period 1988–2016
(e) India’s β1: period 1993–2007 (f) India’s β1: period 1993–2016
Figure 8: 3D representation of β1 as a function of θ and τ for largest oil
importing countries.
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(a) South Korea’s β1: period 1988–2007 (b) South Korea’s β1: period 1988–2016
(c) Germany’s β1: period 1988–2007 (d) Germany’s β1: period 1988–2016
(e) Taiwan’s β1: period 1988–2007 (f) Taiwan’s β1: period 1988–2016
Figure 9: 3D representation of β1 as a function of θ and τ for medium oil
importing countries.
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B. Oil exporting countries
The slope estimates for oil importing countries are presented in Figures 10
& 11 below for both the baseline period 1988:1–2007:12 and the extended
period 1988:1–2016:12. Except Venezuela for which data are not available
for the extended period 1988:1–2016:12, we see that the slope estimates
are different between the two periods for the other countries. This again
highlights that the instability of the relationship between the distributions
of oil price shocks and stock market returns over time. For the baseline
period 1988:1–2007:12, the estimated β̂1j(θ, τ) tend to meander around
zero in most of the parameter regions, a finding similar to Sim and Zhou
(2015, Fig. 4). However, we note that when stock markets are performing
well, a large negative oil price shock (q1) does not have a significant impact
on the stock returns in any of the countries, while poor market conditions
affects the stock returns of all countries when there is a large negative oil
price shock (q1 : Canada) or a small negative oil price shock (q2 : Russia,
Norway, Mexico, and Venezuela). The latter results highlight not only the
similarities between Russia and Venezuela on one side, and Norway and
Mexico on the other, but also how Russia and Venezuela differ from Norway
and Mexico (as poor market conditions combining with a small negative
oil price shock tend to increase stock returns in the former countries while
the opposite effect is observed for the latter). For the extended period
1988:1–2016:12, except Russia, the estimates of β̂1j(θ, τ) tend to meander
around zero in most of the parameter regions, and we do not observe a
significant effects on their stock returns when market are performing well
and there is a negative oil price shock (q1 or q2), and similarly for Russia.
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(a) Russia’s β1: period 1995–2007 (b) Russia’s β1: period 1995–2016
(c) Norway’s β1: period 1988–2007 (d) Norway’s β1: period 1988–2016
(e) Canada’s β1: period 1988–2007 (f) Canada’s β1: period 1988–2016
Figure 10: 3D representation of β1 as a function of θ and τ for oil exporting
countries: Russia, Norway, and Canada
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(a) Mexico’s β1: period 1988–2007 (b) Mexico’s β1: period 1988–2016
(c) Venezuela’s β1: period 1993–2007
Figure 11: 3D representation of β1 as a function of θ and τ for oil exporting
countries: Mexico and Venezuela.
C. Moderately oil dependent countries
Figures 12 & 13 below show the 3D representation of the slope estimates
for moderately oil dependent countries for both the baseline period
1988:1–2007:12 and the extended period 1988:1–2016:12. While Malaysia
shows little differences in the slope estimates for both periods, the form of
the shapes differ between periods for Philippines, Thailand, and Colombia.
This again indicates that the relationship between the distributions of
oil price shocks and stock market returns is not stable over time. More
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importantly, we see that the results of Thailand are no longer similar to
that of China and Japan for both the baseline and extended periods, as was
the case of the intercept estimates [see Figure 7]. Furthermore, Malaysia,
Philippines, and Thailand share the same results in the sense that when
the stock market is performing poorly (θ-quantiles of the stock returns less
than 0.25), a small negative oil price shock (q2) often results in low returns,
while Colombia experience lower returns when the market is performing
poorly (θ-quantiles of the stock returns less than 0.25) and there is a large
negative oil price shock (q1). Finally, while the estimates of β̂1j(θ, τ) tend
to meander around zero in most of the parameter regions for the extended
period 1988:1–2016:12 [similar to Sim and Zhou (2015, Fig. 4)], we do not
observe such a phenomenon for the baseline period 1988:1–2007:12, which
is at odds with the main finding by Sim and Zhou (2015) for the US.
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(a) Malaysia’s β1: period 1988–2007 (b) Malaysia’s β1: period 1988–2016
(c) Philippines’s β1: period 1988–2007 (d) Philippines’s β1: period 1988–2016
Figure 12: 3D representation of β1 as a function of θ and τ for moderately oil
dependent countries: Malaysia and Philippines
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(a) Thailand’s β1: period 1988–2007 (b) Thailand’s β1: period 1988–2016
(c) Colombia’s β1: period 1993–2007 (d) Colombia’s β1: period 1993–2016
Figure 13: 3D representation of β1 as a function of θ and τ for moderately oil
dependent countries: Thailand and Colombia
4 Discussion
Stock markets are often linked with economic performance, e.g. higher
stock prices reflect an increase in the discounted expected earnings which
provides potentially useful information about future economic growth. The
hypothesis that oil prices affect economic growth through their relationship
with the stock market returns is now widely accepted. Higher oil prices, for
example, contributes to headline inflation that reduces real consumption
and economic agents may be willing to accept lower rate of returns on
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financial assets in order to smooth consumption to future periods. Higher
oil prices also lead to higher cost of production, which may constrain
the economy and limit investment opportunities. The basic theory of
asset pricing says that factors that have plausible systematic influence
on consumption or investment opportunities, such as crude oil prices,
should affect the pricing of large stock aggregates. However, the empirical
evidence on the effects that oil price shocks exert on stocks using mean
regression-type analyses has been mitigated or sometimes inconclusive.13
Sim and Zhou (2015) show that a quantile-on-quantile (QQ) regression
approach can reveal interesting characteristics about the link between the
stock markets and oil price shocks that are usually buried under OLS-type
regressions. In particular, they find that large negative oil price shocks (i.e.,
low oil price shock quantiles) affect the US stock returns positively when
the US market is performing well (i.e., high return quantiles), while positive
oil price shocks have no effect on the US stock returns. This asymmetric
effect of oil price shocks implies that only large negative oil price shocks
have an impact on the US economic growth, and that small negative oil
price shocks (i.e., middle oil price shock quantiles) and positive oil price
shocks (i.e., upper oil price shock quantiles) have no significant effect on
the real economic activity.
In this study, we have extended Sim and Zhou’s (2015) analysis to
15 countries which include oil importers, exporters, and moderately oil
dependent countries. Our results should be viewed as purely descriptive
and we are far from identifying causal patterns between the distribution of
13e.g., see Kling (1985), Jones and Kaul (1996), Chen et al. (1986), Apergis and Miller
(2009), Abhyankar et al. (2013), and Lin et al. (2010), among others.
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oil price shocks and that of stock market returns. We found that the results
by Sim and Zhou (2015) are not universal and should not be generalized
naively to other countries. Unlike the US, there is no asymmetric effect of
oil price shocks on stock returns for most countries considered (including
the largest oil importers: China, Japan, and India). In particular, positive
oil price shocks (i.e., upper oil price quantiles) often tend to have a bigger
impact on the stock returns than large negative oil price shocks (i.e., low oil
price quantiles) in most countries covered, which is at odds with Sim and
Zhou (2015). This suggests that in most of the 15 countries studied, all oil
price shock types (from large negative to large positive) can substantially
affect economic growth when the stock market performs well. For example,
under well performing markets, a large positive oil price shock will often
boost the stock returns (thus the economy) more than a large negative oil
price shock in Russia, Canada, China, South Korea, Norway, Malaysia, and
Philippines. This finding underscores the complexity of the relationship
between oil price shocks and economic growth. In addition, our results
indicate that under poor market conditions (quantiles of the stock returns
less than 0.25), all types of oil price shocks (from large negative to large
positive) decrease stock returns (thus have a negative effect on economic
growth) for all countries; see the negative estimated impact in Tables 2-4.
Although this result is anticipated, it is interesting to note some similarities
across countries which corroborate the findings by Sim and Zhou (2015).
In particular, most countries, with the exception of Canada and Norway,
experience their deepest decrease in stock returns when the stock market
is performing poorly and there is larger negative oil price shocks (q1).
It is possible that the main US results by Sim and Zhou (2015) could
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not be generalized to the 15 other countries because of the drastic change
in the early 2000s that the US oil supply has experienced due to the
shale revolution in the oil production; see Bataa and Park (2017). The
structural break in Bataa and Park (2017) was estimated to have taken
place around June 2002, so we re-estimate our model for the pre-break
period 1988:1–2001:12 to further investigate this issue. We consider both
the US and the 15 countries in our sample.14 Table 5 shows the results of
the intercept estimates.
First, with the exception of Japan, when the market is performing well,
the results of the other 14 countries do not align with that of the US
in the pre-structural break period (see Table 5). In particular, China,
India, South Korea, Mexico, and Norway all experience higher returns when
there is a large positive oil price shock and the stock market is performing
well, while the US and Japan experience greater returns when there is
a large negative oil price shock under the same market conditions. This
suggests that the drastic change in the early 2000s that the US oil supply
has experienced due to the shale revolution in the oil production may not
be the only driver of our main findings in Section 3. Second, restricting
the analysis to the pre-structural break period 1988:1–2001:12 reinforces
our earlier conclusions that the relationship between the distributions of
oil price shocks and stock market returns is not stable over time in most
countries (Table 5 vs. Tables 2-4). Again, we find the anticipated result
that all countries (including the US) experience lower stock returns when
the market is performing poorly (quantiles of the stock returns less than
14Canada and Taiwan are not included in Table 5 due to insufficient data for the QQ
estimation.
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0.25) irrespective of the type of oil price shock (from large negative to
large positive). Like the US, most countries experience the largest decrease
in stock returns under poor market conditions for large negative oil price
shocks, with the exceptions of Mexico and India. While most countries seem
to follow this trend at one point in time, the list of exceptions depends on




Market conditions Oil price shock
Max impact of β0
China Japan India S. Korea Germany US
Positive q1 0.272 0.209
∗ 0.101 0.128 0.096 0.110∗
q2 0.139 0.199
∗ 0.194 0.185 0.120 0.102∗
q3 0.196 0.076 0.206 0.159 0.103 0.084
q4 0.542
∗ 0.189 0.269∗ 0.357∗ 0.093 0.077
Negative q1 −0.344∗ −0.279∗ -0.177 −0.342∗ −0.166∗ −0.115∗
q2 -0.154 -0.112 −0.334∗ -0.253 -0.078 -0.076
q3 -0.147 -0.146 -0.161 -0.122 -0.084 -0.056
q4 -0.260 -0.104 −0.106∗ -0.181 -0.087 −0.098∗
Period 1988:–2001:12
Market conditions Oil price shock
Max impact of β0
Mexico Russia Norway Venezuela
Positive q1 0.145 0.281 0.072 0.188
q2 0.134 0.461 0.103 0.322
∗
q3 0.157 0.427 0.136 0.216
q4 0.262
∗ 0.268 0.191∗ 0.244
Negative q1 −0.225∗ −0.824∗ −0.195∗ −0.522∗
q2 −0.396∗ -0.597 -0.128 -0.342
q3 -0.112 -0.258 -0.140 -0.459
Table 5: Joint effects of market conditions and oil price shocks on the intercept estimate for all countries.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we replicate the quantile-on-quantile model developed by Sim
and Zhou (2015) to measure the dependence between the distribution of
the US stock returns and that of oil price shocks, and we extend the model
to 15 other countries. These countries are separated into three categories
depending on their net trade balance in crude oil: (i) oil importers– China,
Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; (ii) oil exporters–
Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, and Venezuela; and (iii) moderately oil
dependent countries– Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Columbia.
Our findings reveal that the relationship between the distributions of
oil price shocks and stock market returns is usually unstable overtime, and
varies depending on the countries’ classification. In particular, we show that
the conclusion by Sim and Zhou (2015) that large negative oil price shocks
increase stock returns when markets are performing well is only partially
supported by the largest oil importers– China, Japan and India– during
the period 1988:1–2007:12. This relationship however does not hold when
extending the study to more recent data (period 1988:1–2016:12). In that
case, we find that China and India present higher returns when markets
perform well and there is a large positive oil price shock. Furthermore, we
find that large positive oil price shocks often lead to higher stock returns
when markets perform well for both oil exporting countries– Canada,
Russia, Norway– and moderately oil dependent countries– such as Malaysia,
Philippines and Thailand. In most cases, large oil price shocks depress
further already poorly performing markets, as in Sim and Zhou (2015).
Finally, the asymmetric effect between positive and negative oil price shocks
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observed in the US market by Sim and Zhou (2015) is less evident in most




Market conditions Oil price shock Max β0 : 1973–2007 Max β0 : 19738–2016









Table 6: Joint market conditions and oil price shocks on the intercept estimate
for the US: 1973:1-2007:12 and 1973:1-2016:12
(a) US β0: period 1973–2007 (b) US β0: period 1973–2016
(c) US β1: period 1973–2007 (d) US β1: period 1973–2016
Figure 14: 3D representation of β0 and β1 as a function of θ and τ for the US
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Variable Name Source
Oil price/production levels http://www-personal.umich.edu/˜lkilian/
Index of cargo ocean shipping freight rates http://www-personal.umich.edu/˜lkilian/
US stock market returns Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
Standard stock market price index: MSCHIN$, MSGERM$, MSINDI$, MSJPAN$
China, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan MSKORE$, MSTAIW$, MSCNDA$, MSMEXF$
Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Venezeuala MSNWAY$, MSRUSS$, MSVENF$, MSCOLM$,
Colombia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, MSMALF$, MSPHLF$, MSTHAF$ :
MSCI (Datastream)
Consumer Price Index: CHCCPI..E, BDCCPI..E, INCCPI..E, JPCCPI..E
China, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan KOCCPI..E, TWCCPI..E, CNCCPI..E, MXCCPI..E
Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Venezeuala NWCCPI..E, RSCCPI..E, VECONPRCF, CBCCPI..E
Colombia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, MYCCPI..E, PHCCPI..E, THCCPI..E, Datastream
Table 7: Data Source
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